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chore(deps): update dependency langchain-core to v1.2.11 [security]#262

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chore(deps): update dependency langchain-core to v1.2.11 [security]#262
a-klos wants to merge 1 commit intomainfrom
renovate/pypi-langchain-core-vulnerability

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@a-klos a-klos commented Feb 15, 2026

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
langchain-core (changelog) 1.2.9 -> 1.2.11 age confidence
langchain-core (changelog) 1.2.7 -> 1.2.11 age confidence

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2026-26013

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in ChatOpenAI Image Token Counting

Summary

The ChatOpenAI.get_num_tokens_from_messages() method fetches arbitrary image_url values without validation when computing token counts for vision-enabled models. This allows attackers to trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks by providing malicious image URLs in user input.

Severity

Low - The vulnerability allows SSRF attacks but has limited impact due to:

  • Responses are not returned to the attacker (blind SSRF)
  • Default 5-second timeout limits resource exhaustion
  • Non-image responses fail at PIL image parsing

Impact

An attacker who can control image URLs passed to get_num_tokens_from_messages() can:

  • Trigger HTTP requests from the application server to arbitrary internal or external URLs
  • Cause the server to access internal network resources (private IPs, cloud metadata endpoints)
  • Cause minor resource consumption through image downloads (bounded by timeout)

Note: This vulnerability occurs during token counting, which may happen outside of model invocation (e.g., in logging, metrics, or token budgeting flows).

Details

The vulnerable code path:

  1. get_num_tokens_from_messages() processes messages containing image_url content blocks
  2. For images without detail: "low", it calls _url_to_size() to fetch the image and compute token counts
  3. _url_to_size() performs httpx.get(image_source) on any URL without validation
  4. Prior to the patch, there was no SSRF protection, size limits, or explicit timeout

File: libs/partners/openai/langchain_openai/chat_models/base.py

Patches

The vulnerability has been patched in langchain-openai==1.1.9 (requires langchain-core==1.2.11).

The patch adds:

  1. SSRF validation using langchain_core._security._ssrf_protection.validate_safe_url() to block:
    • Private IP ranges (RFC 1918, loopback, link-local)
    • Cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254, etc.)
    • Invalid URL schemes
  2. Explicit size limits (50 MB maximum, matching OpenAI's payload limit)
  3. Explicit timeout (5 seconds, same as httpx.get default)
  4. Allow disabling image fetching via allow_fetching_images=False parameter

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade immediately:

  1. Sanitize input: Validate and filter image_url values before passing messages to token counting or model invocation
  2. Use network controls: Implement egress filtering to prevent outbound requests to private IPs

Configuration

📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" in timezone UTC, Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).

🚦 Automerge: Enabled.

Rebasing: Whenever PR is behind base branch, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about these updates again.


  • If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

This PR has been generated by Renovate Bot.

@a-klos a-klos added python Pull requests that update python code renovate labels Feb 15, 2026
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