objectstack-ai · os-zhuang · Jul 8, 2026 · Jul 8, 2026 · Jul 8, 2026
diff --git a/.changeset/secure-by-default-system-objects.md b/.changeset/secure-by-default-system-objects.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+---
+'@objectstack/platform-objects': minor
+---
+
+Secure-by-default posture for sensitive system objects (ADR-0066 ④, system-object
+slice) — the platform's raw secret/credential stores no longer ride the wildcard
+`'*'` permission grant.
+
+`sys_secret` (encrypted settings/datasource secrets), `sys_jwks` (JWT signing
+keys), `sys_verification` (password-reset / verify tokens),
+`sys_oauth_access_token`, `sys_oauth_refresh_token` (live bearer credentials),
+and `sys_device_code` (pending device-grant codes) now declare
+`access: { default: 'private' }`: an ordinary member's generic data-layer
+read/write gets 403 instead of being covered by `member_default`'s
+`'*': allowRead`. Platform admins retain access via the posture-gated
+`viewAllRecords`/`modifyAllRecords` superuser bypass, and every runtime consumer
+is unaffected — better-auth reads via its adapter (system context),
+`engine.resolveSecret` reads at driver level, and SettingsService / the
+datasource secret-binder read principal-less (middleware falls open for internal
+calls).
+
+`sys_scim_provider` (SCIM bearer-token config) gains the object-level
+`requiredPermissions: ['manage_platform_settings']` capability gate, mirroring
+its sibling `sys_sso_provider`. The Setup nav item for Signing Keys (JWKS) is
+now capability-gated like API Keys, so non-admins don't see a menu entry that
+can only 403.
+
+Member self-service objects (`sys_session`, `sys_api_key`,
+`sys_oauth_application`, `sys_two_factor`) deliberately keep the public posture —
+the Account app ("My Sessions" / "My API Keys" / "My Apps" / 2FA "My
+Enrollment") reads them through the generic data layer as the member; row
+scoping remains their guard. The declarations are pinned by
+`platform-objects.test.ts` and the ADR-0056 D10 conformance-matrix row
+`secure-by-default-posture`, so dropping the flag from a secret store fails CI.
diff --git a/content/docs/permissions/authorization.mdx b/content/docs/permissions/authorization.mdx
@@ -181,6 +181,16 @@ The complete, prioritized gap map lives in issue **#2561** (the production
   object's `requiredPermissions` may be a `string[]` (gates all CRUD) or a
   `{ read, create, update, delete }` map (read-open / write-gated), enforced
   per operation by plugin-security (`security-plugin.ts` capability AND-gate).
+- **Secure-by-default rollout** (ADR-0066 ④) — **system-object slice landed**:
+  the raw secret/credential stores (`sys_secret`, `sys_jwks`,
+  `sys_verification`, `sys_oauth_access_token`, `sys_oauth_refresh_token`,
+  `sys_device_code`) declare `access: { default: 'private' }` — no wildcard
+  grant reaches them; platform admins retain access via the posture-gated
+  superuser bypass. `sys_scim_provider` is capability-gated like
+  `sys_sso_provider`. Member self-service objects (`sys_session`,
+  `sys_api_key`, `sys_oauth_application`, `sys_two_factor`) deliberately stay
+  public-posture (the Account app reads them as the member; row scoping is
+  their guard). Still open: Studio posture surfacing (objectui).
 - **Deny/muting subtract layer** (ADR-0005 overlay; ADR-0066 precedence step 4)
   — how an environment adjusts a *packaged* set without forking it; deferred
   until proven need (ADR-0086 P2).

diff --git a/content/docs/ui/setup-app.mdx b/content/docs/ui/setup-app.mdx
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ anchors are:
 | **Configuration** (`group_configuration`) | All Settings · Branding · Authentication · Email · File Storage · AI & Embedder · Knowledge · Feature Flags — `platform-objects` |
 | **Diagnostics** (`group_diagnostics`) | Sessions · Notification Events — `platform-objects`; Audit Logs — `plugin-audit` |
 | **Integrations** (`group_integrations`) | `plugin-webhooks` |
-| **Advanced** (`group_advanced`) | OAuth Applications · Signing Keys (JWKS) · Verifications · Device Codes · Identity Links · User Preferences — `platform-objects` |
+| **Advanced** (`group_advanced`) | OAuth Applications · Signing Keys (JWKS) · Identity Links · User Preferences — `platform-objects` |
 
 The exact rendered menu depends on which capability plugins are loaded.
 A few notable entries:
@@ -66,7 +66,12 @@ A few notable entries:
 - **OAuth Applications** (`sys_oauth_application`) — third-party OAuth
   client registrations, contributed into `group_advanced`.
 - **Signing Keys (JWKS)** (`sys_jwks`) — JWKS keys used for OIDC / JWT
-  signing, contributed into `group_advanced`.
+  signing, contributed into `group_advanced`. The nav item is gated on the
+  `manage_platform_settings` capability, and the object itself is
+  `access: { default: 'private' }` (ADR-0066 ④) — signing keys are never
+  covered by the wildcard grant, so non-admins are denied server-side.
+  (`sys_verification` and `sys_device_code` are deliberately **not** in the
+  nav: sensitive, ephemeral secrets — not browsable, and also `private`.)
 - **Audit Logs** (`sys_audit_log`) — contributed by `plugin-audit` into
   `group_diagnostics`. (The `sys_activity` and `sys_comment` objects also
   live in `plugin-audit`, but they are not contributed as Setup nav

diff --git a/docs/adr/0066-unified-authorization-model.md b/docs/adr/0066-unified-authorization-model.md
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ All of this is **open mechanism** (framework `spec` + `plugin-security`): schema
 
 Captured for the record; **out of scope for Phases 1–4 above**. Each is anchored to a mainstream-platform precedent.
 
-- **④ Deny-by-default target for sensitive objects.** Salesforce / Dataverse / ServiceNow / SAP are all deny-by-default; ObjectStack stays allow-by-default for *tenant business* objects (low-code ergonomics, à la Airtable/Notion within a workspace) but should make **system / control-plane / sensitive** objects `private` by default, ship genuine reference data (countries, currencies, picklists) as explicit `public`, and surface each object's posture visibly in Studio. The `access` flag (D2) is the primitive; this is a defaults + visibility call, staged per object — no forced migration.
+- **④ Deny-by-default target for sensitive objects.** Salesforce / Dataverse / ServiceNow / SAP are all deny-by-default; ObjectStack stays allow-by-default for *tenant business* objects (low-code ergonomics, à la Airtable/Notion within a workspace) but should make **system / control-plane / sensitive** objects `private` by default, ship genuine reference data (countries, currencies, picklists) as explicit `public`, and surface each object's posture visibly in Studio. The `access` flag (D2) is the primitive; this is a defaults + visibility call, staged per object — no forced migration. **System-object slice landed (2026-07):** the raw secret/credential stores — `sys_secret`, `sys_jwks`, `sys_verification`, `sys_oauth_access_token`, `sys_oauth_refresh_token`, `sys_device_code` — declare `access: { default: 'private' }`, and `sys_scim_provider` carries the D3 capability gate (mirroring `sys_sso_provider`); pinned by `platform-objects.test.ts` + the D10 matrix row `secure-by-default-posture`. Member self-service objects (`sys_session`, `sys_api_key`, `sys_oauth_application`, `sys_two_factor`) deliberately stay public-posture — the Account app reads them with a member context; row scoping is their guard. Still open: Studio posture surfacing (objectui) and the explicit-`public` reference-data convention (no such objects ship in framework today).
 - **⑤ Per-operation `requiredPermissions`.** Today object-level `requiredPermissions` gates all of CRUD. ERP routinely needs "read-open / write-gated" (Salesforce & Dataverse separate capability by operation). Allow `requiredPermissions` to be either `string[]` (all operations) or a per-operation map `{ read, create, update, delete }`. Field-level (D3) and action-level (D4) requirements already give finer control; this closes the object-level gap. **Landed (2026-07):** spec `ObjectRequiredPermissionsSchema` union (`spec/data/object.zod.ts`); enforced per operation in `plugin-security/security-plugin.ts` (the `all` bucket preserves the array form's gate-everything semantics, so it is backward-compatible). `transfer`/`restore` fold into `update`, `purge` into `delete` via `crudBucketForOperation`.
 - **⑥ Capabilities in the expression surface.** Salesforce *Custom Permissions* are referenceable in formulas / validation / flows (`$Permission.X`). Expose the caller's held capabilities to the CEL/predicate surface (ADR-0058) so `visible` / validation / sharing predicates can branch on a capability. High-leverage once D1 makes capabilities first-class.
 - **⑦ Permission-set groups + subtractive *muting*.** Pure union does not scale governance ("permission-set explosion"); Salesforce added permission-set-group *muting* precisely to allow taking access away. Roles→permission-sets already bundle; a subtractive/deny layer (precedence step 4) is the missing piece for large-org administration. Pairs with delegated admin (#9).

diff --git a/packages/dogfood/test/authz-conformance.matrix.ts b/packages/dogfood/test/authz-conformance.matrix.ts
@@ -75,6 +75,9 @@ export const AUTHZ_CONFORMANCE: AuthzPrimitive[] = [
     enforcement: 'plugin-security/rls-compiler.ts isSupportedRlsExpression + warn' },
   { id: 'system-permissions', summary: 'systemPermissions / tab-app gating', state: 'enforced',
     enforcement: 'rest/rest-server.ts filterAppForUser' },
+  { id: 'secure-by-default-posture', summary: 'ADR-0066 ④ — sensitive system objects opt out of the wildcard grant (access.default: private)', state: 'enforced',
+    enforcement: 'plugin-security/permission-evaluator.ts resolveObjectPermission (plain wildcard does not cover a private object) + posture-gated superuser bypass; declarations in platform-objects (sys_secret, sys_jwks, sys_verification, sys_oauth_access_token, sys_oauth_refresh_token, sys_device_code) + sys_scim_provider D3 capability gate',
+    note: 'Primitive enforcement unit-proven in plugin-security/security-plugin.test.ts (ADR-0066 posture suite); the per-object declarations are pinned by platform-objects.test.ts "secure-by-default posture" so dropping the flag from a secret store fails CI, not review. Member self-service objects (sys_session, sys_api_key, sys_oauth_application, sys_two_factor) deliberately stay public-posture — the Account app reads them with a member context; row scoping (owner/tenant RLS + _self carve-outs) is their guard.' },
 
   // ── Experimental — declared, NOT enforced (ADR-0049/0056 D8) ───────────
   { id: 'compliance-configs', summary: 'GDPR/HIPAA/PCI configs', state: 'experimental', note: 'no runtime consumer; marked [EXPERIMENTAL] (D8)' },

diff --git a/packages/platform-objects/src/apps/setup-nav.contributions.ts b/packages/platform-objects/src/apps/setup-nav.contributions.ts
@@ -122,7 +122,11 @@ export const SETUP_NAV_CONTRIBUTIONS: NavigationContribution[] = [
     priority: BASE_PRIORITY,
     items: [
       { id: 'nav_oauth_apps', type: 'object', label: 'OAuth Applications', objectName: 'sys_oauth_application', icon: 'app-window' },
-      { id: 'nav_jwks', type: 'object', label: 'Signing Keys (JWKS)', objectName: 'sys_jwks', icon: 'key-round' },
+      // nav_jwks is capability-gated (like nav_api_keys): sys_jwks is
+      // `access.default:'private'` (ADR-0066 ④ — signing keys), so a
+      // non-admin's list request 403s server-side; gating the nav item keeps
+      // the menu honest instead of showing an entry that can only error.
+      { id: 'nav_jwks', type: 'object', label: 'Signing Keys (JWKS)', objectName: 'sys_jwks', icon: 'key-round', requiredPermissions: ['manage_platform_settings'] },
       // `sys_verification` (email/phone tokens) and `sys_device_code` (OAuth
       // device-grant codes) deliberately omit `list` from their `apiMethods`
       // (sensitive, ephemeral secrets — not browsable), so an object/list-view

diff --git a/packages/platform-objects/src/identity/sys-device-code.object.ts b/packages/platform-objects/src/identity/sys-device-code.object.ts
@@ -26,6 +26,12 @@ export const SysDeviceCode = ObjectSchema.create({
   icon: 'key-round',
   isSystem: true,
   managedBy: 'better-auth',
+  // [ADR-0066 D2/④] Secure-by-default: rows are LIVE pending device-grant
+  // codes — reading `user_code`/`device_code` lets an attacker hijack a
+  // pending CLI login. Not covered by the wildcard `'*'` grant; admins retain
+  // access via the superuser bypass; better-auth reads via its adapter
+  // (system context), so the device-grant flow is unaffected.
+  access: { default: 'private' },
   // ADR-0010 §3.7 — managed by better-auth; tenants may not edit schema,
   // but may add overlay row-level config. Use `no-overlay` if you need to
   // forbid sys_metadata overlays entirely.

diff --git a/packages/platform-objects/src/identity/sys-jwks.object.ts b/packages/platform-objects/src/identity/sys-jwks.object.ts
@@ -21,6 +21,13 @@ export const SysJwks = ObjectSchema.create({
   icon: 'key',
   isSystem: true,
   managedBy: 'better-auth',
+  // [ADR-0066 D2/④] Secure-by-default: rows are the environment's JWT SIGNING
+  // KEYS (private key material). Not covered by the wildcard `'*'` grant — an
+  // ordinary member gets 403 from the generic data layer. Platform admins
+  // (viewAllRecords/modifyAllRecords) retain access via the posture-gated
+  // superuser bypass; better-auth itself reads via its adapter (system
+  // context), so token signing/verification is unaffected.
+  access: { default: 'private' },
   // ADR-0010 §3.7 — managed by better-auth; tenants may not edit schema,
   // but may add overlay row-level config. Use `no-overlay` if you need to
   // forbid sys_metadata overlays entirely.

diff --git a/packages/platform-objects/src/identity/sys-oauth-access-token.object.ts b/packages/platform-objects/src/identity/sys-oauth-access-token.object.ts
@@ -22,6 +22,11 @@ export const SysOauthAccessToken = ObjectSchema.create({
   icon: 'ticket',
   isSystem: true,
   managedBy: 'better-auth',
+  // [ADR-0066 D2/④] Secure-by-default: rows are LIVE bearer credentials —
+  // reading one is session hijack. Not covered by the wildcard `'*'` grant;
+  // admins retain access via the superuser bypass; better-auth reads via its
+  // adapter (system context), so OAuth flows are unaffected.
+  access: { default: 'private' },
   // ADR-0010 §3.7 — managed by better-auth; tenants may not edit schema,
   // but may add overlay row-level config. Use `no-overlay` if you need to
   // forbid sys_metadata overlays entirely.

diff --git a/packages/platform-objects/src/identity/sys-oauth-refresh-token.object.ts b/packages/platform-objects/src/identity/sys-oauth-refresh-token.object.ts
@@ -21,6 +21,11 @@ export const SysOauthRefreshToken = ObjectSchema.create({
   icon: 'refresh-cw',
   isSystem: true,
   managedBy: 'better-auth',
+  // [ADR-0066 D2/④] Secure-by-default: rows are LIVE long-lived credentials —
+  // a refresh token mints new access tokens. Not covered by the wildcard `'*'`
+  // grant; admins retain access via the superuser bypass; better-auth reads
+  // via its adapter (system context), so OAuth flows are unaffected.
+  access: { default: 'private' },
   // ADR-0010 §3.7 — managed by better-auth; tenants may not edit schema,
   // but may add overlay row-level config. Use `no-overlay` if you need to
   // forbid sys_metadata overlays entirely.

diff --git a/packages/platform-objects/src/identity/sys-scim-provider.object.ts b/packages/platform-objects/src/identity/sys-scim-provider.object.ts
@@ -33,6 +33,14 @@ export const SysScimProvider = ObjectSchema.create({
   icon: 'users',
   isSystem: true,
   managedBy: 'better-auth',
+  // [ADR-0066 D3/④] Admin-only identity config carrying a live credential
+  // (`scim_token` — the bearer external IdPs authenticate provisioning calls
+  // with). Object-level capability gate, mirroring the sibling
+  // `sys_sso_provider`: ordinary members are denied entirely (without it, the
+  // `member_default` wildcard `'*': allowRead` would expose SCIM connections
+  // to every authenticated user). better-auth's own endpoints read via a
+  // system context, so SCIM provisioning is unaffected.
+  requiredPermissions: ['manage_platform_settings'],
   // ADR-0010 §3.7 — managed by better-auth; tenants may not edit schema.
   protection: {
     lock: 'full',

diff --git a/packages/platform-objects/src/identity/sys-verification.object.ts b/packages/platform-objects/src/identity/sys-verification.object.ts
@@ -17,6 +17,12 @@ export const SysVerification = ObjectSchema.create({
   icon: 'shield-check',
   isSystem: true,
   managedBy: 'better-auth',
+  // [ADR-0066 D2/④] Secure-by-default: rows are LIVE one-time credentials
+  // (email/phone verification + password-reset tokens) — reading one is
+  // account takeover. Not covered by the wildcard `'*'` grant; admins retain
+  // access via the superuser bypass; better-auth reads via its adapter
+  // (system context), so verification flows are unaffected.
+  access: { default: 'private' },
   // ADR-0010 §3.7 — managed by better-auth; tenants may not edit schema,
   // but may add overlay row-level config. Use `no-overlay` if you need to
   // forbid sys_metadata overlays entirely.

diff --git a/packages/platform-objects/src/platform-objects.test.ts b/packages/platform-objects/src/platform-objects.test.ts
@@ -4,10 +4,15 @@ import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
 import {
   SysAccount,
   SysApiKey,
+  SysDeviceCode,
   SysInvitation,
+  SysJwks,
   SysMember,
+  SysOauthAccessToken,
   SysOauthApplication,
+  SysOauthRefreshToken,
   SysOrganization,
+  SysScimProvider,
   SysSession,
   SysTeam,
   SysTeamMember,
@@ -27,7 +32,7 @@ import {
   SysMetadata,
   SysMetadataHistoryObject,
 } from './metadata/index.js';
-import { SysSetting } from './system/index.js';
+import { SysSecret, SysSetting } from './system/index.js';
 import { ACCOUNT_APP, SETUP_APP, SETUP_NAV_CONTRIBUTIONS, STUDIO_APP } from './apps/index.js';
 import { AppSchema } from '@objectstack/spec/ui';
 
@@ -63,6 +68,44 @@ describe('@objectstack/platform-objects', () => {
     expect((object as any).tableName).toBeUndefined();
   });
 
+  describe('secure-by-default posture (ADR-0066 ④)', () => {
+    // Raw secret / live-credential stores are opted OUT of the wildcard `'*'`
+    // grant: only an explicit per-object grant or the posture-gated superuser
+    // bypass (viewAllRecords/modifyAllRecords) reaches them. These assertions
+    // PIN the rollout — dropping the flag from any of these objects silently
+    // re-exposes signing keys / reset tokens / bearer credentials to every
+    // authenticated member, so a removal must fail here first (ADR-0078:
+    // no silent regression to the inert/exposed state).
+    const privateObjects = [
+      ['SysSecret', SysSecret],               // encrypted settings/datasource secrets
+      ['SysJwks', SysJwks],                   // JWT signing private keys
+      ['SysVerification', SysVerification],   // password-reset / verify tokens
+      ['SysOauthAccessToken', SysOauthAccessToken],   // live bearer tokens
+      ['SysOauthRefreshToken', SysOauthRefreshToken], // live refresh tokens
+      ['SysDeviceCode', SysDeviceCode],       // pending device-grant codes
+    ] as const;
+
+    it.each(privateObjects)('%s declares access.default = private', (_exportName, object) => {
+      expect((object as any).access?.default).toBe('private');
+    });
+
+    it('SysScimProvider is capability-gated like its sibling sys_sso_provider', () => {
+      // Admin config with an embedded live credential (scim_token) — the D3
+      // capability gate (not the private posture) is the sso/scim pattern.
+      expect((SysScimProvider as any).requiredPermissions).toEqual(['manage_platform_settings']);
+    });
+
+    it('member self-service objects deliberately stay on the public posture', () => {
+      // Account app ("My Sessions" / "My API Keys" / "My Apps") and the 2FA
+      // "My Enrollment" view read these via the generic data layer with a
+      // MEMBER context — flipping them private would break self-service.
+      // Row scoping (owner/tenant RLS + _self carve-outs) is their guard.
+      for (const object of [SysSession, SysApiKey, SysOauthApplication, SysTwoFactor]) {
+        expect((object as any).access?.default).not.toBe('private');
+      }
+    });
+  });
+
   describe('sysadmin row actions', () => {
     // Setup-App admins must be able to drive the access-control lifecycle
     // without dropping to SQL. These assertions lock in the high-traffic

diff --git a/packages/platform-objects/src/system/sys-secret.object.ts b/packages/platform-objects/src/system/sys-secret.object.ts
@@ -36,6 +36,14 @@ export const SysSecret = ObjectSchema.create({
   icon: 'key',
   isSystem: true,
   managedBy: 'system',
+  // [ADR-0066 D2/④] Secure-by-default: the environment's encrypted-secrets
+  // store (settings/datasource credentials). Not covered by the wildcard `'*'`
+  // grant — ordinary members get 403 from the generic data layer. Platform
+  // admins retain access via the posture-gated superuser bypass. Internal
+  // readers are unaffected: `engine.resolveSecret` reads at DRIVER level,
+  // SettingsService / the datasource secret-binder read with no principal
+  // (middleware falls open for principal-less internal calls).
+  access: { default: 'private' },
   description: 'Cipher store referenced by sys_setting handles. Never holds plaintext.',
   highlightFields: ['namespace', 'key', 'kms_key_id', 'version', 'rotated_at'],
   listViews: {