🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix timing attack vulnerability in token validation#711
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matdev83 wants to merge 1 commit into
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🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix timing attack vulnerability in token validation#711matdev83 wants to merge 1 commit into
matdev83 wants to merge 1 commit into
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…dation 🚨 Severity: CRITICAL 💡 Vulnerability: API key and authentication token validation in `AuthMiddleware` and `APIKeyMiddleware` used standard Python string equality (`!=`) and set membership (`in`) checks. These standard comparison operators perform short-circuit evaluation, returning immediately upon finding a mismatch. This means the time it takes for a server to reject a request depends on how many characters of the provided token match the correct token, allowing a timing attack to brute-force valid tokens. 🎯 Impact: Attackers could potentially deduce valid API keys or auth tokens by measuring response times, leading to unauthorized access. 🔧 Fix: Replaced standard equality checks with `secrets.compare_digest` in `src/core/security/middleware.py`. This ensures constant-time comparisons, mitigating timing attack risks. ✅ Verification: Ran unit tests for authentication logic to ensure `secrets.compare_digest` operates seamlessly without throwing `TypeError` (by checking `isinstance(valid_key, str)`) and that authentication still effectively works. Co-authored-by: matdev83 <211248003+matdev83@users.noreply.github.com>
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| for valid_key in all_valid_keys: | ||
| if isinstance(valid_key, str) and secrets.compare_digest( |
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Replacing api_key in all_valid_keys with a full for loop over every key makes authentication cost grow linearly with the number of configured keys on every request; this can become a noticeable throughput regression (and CPU amplification vector) in deployments that keep many tenant keys in memory. The same pattern appears in both the dispatch and ASGI __call__ paths, so all API-key-protected traffic pays this cost. Consider preserving constant-time comparison semantics without scanning the entire key set per request.
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| """Test string representation.""" | ||
| state = EndpointHealthState(api_url="https://api.openai.com/v1") | ||
| repr_str = repr(state) | ||
| assert "api.openai.com" in repr_str |
| ) | ||
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| assert config.type == "oauth2" | ||
| assert "amazonaws.com" in config.discovery_url |
| follow_redirects=False, | ||
| ) | ||
| assert response.status_code == 302 | ||
| assert "accounts.google.com" in response.headers["location"] |
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| def _find_free_port(): | ||
| with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as s: | ||
| s.bind(("", 0)) |
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🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix timing attack vulnerability in token validation
🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
💡 Vulnerability: API key and authentication token validation in
AuthMiddlewareandAPIKeyMiddlewareused standard Python string equality (!=) and set membership (in) checks. These standard comparison operators perform short-circuit evaluation, returning immediately upon finding a mismatch. This means the time it takes for a server to reject a request depends on how many characters of the provided token match the correct token, allowing a timing attack to brute-force valid tokens.🎯 Impact: Attackers could potentially deduce valid API keys or auth tokens by measuring response times, leading to unauthorized access.
🔧 Fix: Replaced standard equality checks with
secrets.compare_digestinsrc/core/security/middleware.py. This ensures constant-time comparisons, mitigating timing attack risks.✅ Verification: Ran unit tests for authentication logic to ensure
secrets.compare_digestoperates seamlessly without throwingTypeError(by checkingisinstance(valid_key, str)) and that authentication still effectively works.PR created automatically by Jules for task 11785717866638839489 started by @matdev83