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feat(core): implement global SPEC and fix provider routing failover#68

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jbmendonca wants to merge 14 commits intoEvolutionAPI:mainfrom
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feat(core): implement global SPEC and fix provider routing failover#68
jbmendonca wants to merge 14 commits intoEvolutionAPI:mainfrom
jbmendonca:tkr/v0.33.0-customized

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Implementação da SPEC global do projeto e correção do roteador inteligente do OpenRouter (fallback/failover).

DavidsonGomes and others added 12 commits April 25, 2026 15:33
…volutionAPI#52)

Vault audit §2.S1 CRITICAL: /api/shares/<token>/view had zero rate
limiting. Add flask-limiter (in-memory, single-process MVP) with:
- 60 req/min/IP on view_share (Vault §2.S1)
- Global default 600 req/min on all other routes (non-blocking baseline)
- Referrer-Policy, Cache-Control no-store, Pragma, HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options
  headers on every public share response (Vault §2.S2)

The Limiter singleton lives in rate_limit.py to break the circular-import
chain between app.py (which imports route blueprints) and the blueprints
that need @limiter.limit() decorators.

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ortals (EvolutionAPI#53)

* feat(security): rate-limit public share endpoint + security headers

Vault audit §2.S1 CRITICAL: /api/shares/<token>/view had zero rate
limiting. Add flask-limiter (in-memory, single-process MVP) with:
- 60 req/min/IP on view_share (Vault §2.S1)
- Global default 600 req/min on all other routes (non-blocking baseline)
- Referrer-Policy, Cache-Control no-store, Pragma, HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options
  headers on every public share response (Vault §2.S2)

The Limiter singleton lives in rate_limit.py to break the circular-import
chain between app.py (which imports route blueprints) and the blueprints
that need @limiter.limit() decorators.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(plugins): B2.0 public_pages capability — read-only token-bound portals

Add the public_pages plugin capability (B2.0 scope, read-only):

plugin_schema.py:
- Add Capability.public_pages and Capability.safe_uninstall enum values
- Add PluginPublicPageTokenSource + PluginPublicPage Pydantic models
  (bundle must be under ui/public/, revoked_when disallowed in v1 to prevent SQL injection)
- Extend ReadonlyQuery with public_via + bind_token_param fields
- Add 4 PluginManifest model validators: capability required, table slug-prefix,
  unique ids/route_prefixes, readonly_data references valid page

routes/plugin_public_pages.py (new):
- GET /p/<slug>/<route_prefix>/<token>       — serve portal bundle (60 req/min/IP)
- GET /p/<slug>/<route_prefix>/<token>/data  — serve token-bound readonly query (120/min)
- GET /p/<slug>/public-assets/<path>         — serve ui/public/ static assets
- Token validation via parametric SQL (identifiers validated at install by schema)
- Module-level _PLUGIN_PUBLIC_PREFIXES cache for install/uninstall lifecycle
- Vault §B2.S2: Referrer-Policy, Cache-Control no-store, HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options on all responses
- CSP: default-src 'self' on portal bundles
- Rate limiting via rate_limit.limiter (imported from PR EvolutionAPI#52)

app.py:
- Import and register plugin_public_pages_bp
- /p/... paths already bypass auth_middleware (non-/api/ paths are passthrough)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…vation, sandboxed hook (EvolutionAPI#54)

- plugin_schema.py: PluginSafeUninstall, PluginPreUninstallHook, PluginUserConfirmation
  models + validators (block_uninstall enforcement, preserved_tables slug-prefix check,
  safe_uninstall_enabled_requires_confirmation, no _orphan_* refs in readonly SQL)
- routes/plugins.py: uninstall gate (admin-only, confirmation_phrase, exported_at check,
  zip_password); sandboxed pre-hook subprocess (no secrets, read-only DB copy, 600s timeout);
  cascade-DELETE filtering for preserved_host_entities; orphan table rename
  (_orphan_{slug}_{table}); EVONEXUS_ALLOW_FORCE_UNINSTALL=1 escape hatch with audit;
  reinstall SHA256 check against plugin_orphans before orphan recovery
- app.py: plugin_orphans table migration (id, slug, tablename, orphaned_at,
  orphaned_by_user_id, original_plugin_version, original_sha256, original_publisher_url,
  recovered_at, UNIQUE(slug, tablename))
- PluginUninstall.tsx: 3-step wizard (regulatory reason+checkbox → ZIP password → typed
  phrase); force-uninstall orange banner; integrated in PluginDetail.tsx
- docs/plugin-contract.md: full plugin.yaml contract for public_pages + safe_uninstall

Vault §B3 mitigations: S1 block_uninstall gate, S2 admin enforcement, S3 sandboxed hook,
S4 no _orphan_* SQL refs, S5 AES-256 ZIP password, S6 force-uninstall audit trail.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…er auto-injection (EvolutionAPI#55)

Two related Wave 2.1.x extensions to the plugin contract that close the last
two gaps blocking endpoint-level RBAC for plugin authors (gap inventory in
evonexus-plugin-nutri Step 3 RBAC decision).

Changes
- PluginWritableResource.requires_role: Optional[List[str]] — when set, the
  POST/PUT/DELETE handler returns 403 if current_user.role is not in the list.
  'admin' role always passes (super-user override). Backwards compatible:
  resources without the field accept any authenticated user (legacy default).
  Validator enforces kebab-case role names (^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*$).

- routes.plugins.writable_data: enforces requires_role at the endpoint, with
  a 403 message naming the required roles and the actor's current role.

- routes.plugins.readonly_data: auto-injects :current_user_id and
  :current_user_role as bind params on every readonly query. Plugins can
  reference them directly in SQL for server-enforced scoping without an
  app-layer wrapper. The two parameter names are reserved — client requests
  carrying them in the query string get 400 (no identity spoofing).

Tests
- tests/backend/test_plugins_rbac_and_scoping.py — 13 cases covering Pydantic
  acceptance/rejection, 403/200 paths for writable, scoping/spoofing for readonly,
  backwards compat for resources without requires_role and queries without
  :current_user_id refs.

Compat
- Existing plugins (PM Essentials) continue to work unchanged — the new field
  defaults to None and the auto-injected bind params are silently ignored if
  the SQL doesn't reference them.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ser, raw bundle for clients (EvolutionAPI#56)

The portal_page handler at /p/{slug}/{route_prefix}/{token} previously served
the plugin's JS bundle with mimetype application/javascript regardless of the
caller. Browsers navigating to a portal URL saw the JS source instead of a
rendered page. Discovered during evonexus-plugin-nutri Step 5.

Changes
- portal_page: when the Accept header includes text/html and NOT
  application/javascript, render a minimal HTML shell that loads the bundle
  as <script type="module" src="/p/{slug}/public-assets/{file}"> and
  instantiates the plugin's declared custom_element_name. Token reaches the
  element via data-token attribute (no need for the bundle to re-parse
  window.location).
- _serve_html_shell: new helper. Defensive: validates bundle path is inside
  ui/public/ and custom_element_name matches alphanum-dash before emitting.
  Sets X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff + a tight CSP (default-src 'self',
  frame-ancestors 'none', no external scripts).
- Programmatic clients (curl, fetch with Accept: application/javascript)
  keep getting the raw bundle — backwards compatible.
- Bundle is fetched from the existing /p/{slug}/public-assets/{path} route
  (no token), which is safe because the bundle contains no patient data —
  data lives behind the token-gated /data endpoint.

Tests
- tests/backend/test_plugin_public_pages_html_shell.py — 9 cases:
  HTML accept renders shell, JS accept returns bundle, default Accept (*/*)
  returns bundle, invalid token returns 404 even with HTML accept, CSP +
  X-Content-Type-Options present, custom element name appears exactly once,
  XSS-safe (single <script> tag, token only inside data-token), legacy
  programmatic fetches unchanged.

Compat
- Existing public-page consumers using fetch() with Accept: application/json
  or default see no behaviour change. Plugins that already shipped a bundle
  start rendering correctly in browsers without any plugin update.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…volutionAPI#57)

Bumps version to 0.33.0 so the plugin nutri (which requires this version)
can install. Bundles the five plugin-contract PRs (EvolutionAPI#52EvolutionAPI#56) merged today
into a single release. Plus a UX fix on the install wizard so 409s say why
they conflicted.

The fix
- lib/api.ts buildError now falls back to data.conflicts[0] when the
  standard error/message fields are absent. The plugin preview endpoint
  returns {conflicts: string[], manifest, ...} on 409 — without this fix
  the wizard showed only "409 CONFLICT" with the actual reason hidden.
- PluginInstallModal: conflicts type was Record<string, unknown>, backend
  always returned string[]; the JSON.keys() coercion produced index strings.
  Now typed as string[] and rendered as a list.

Tested
- Frontend tsc --noEmit clean
- Plugin nutri 200 pytest still pass after the 11 `# nosec B603` markers
  added to subprocess.run calls (false positives from regex security scan —
  all calls use list args, no shell=True)

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
… routing

- Base: upstream main (v0.33.0) with all official updates
- Added: TKR security headers (X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, Referrer-Policy)
- Added: CORS CSRF token support (X-CSRF-Token headers)
- Added: Provider failover chain (getProviderCandidates, resolveProviderChain)
- Added: Platform observability, cache, queue, and metrics modules
- Added: Runtime config, structured logging, request/session security
- Added: Frontend: CommandPalette, ThemeContext, Observability page, SecurityTab
- Preserved: upstream OpenRouter Smart Router native integration
- Adapted: Provider-config.js enhanced with routing and default_model support
v0.33.0 — plugin contract bundle (PRs EvolutionAPI#52EvolutionAPI#56) + install error surfacing
- Add /api/onboarding/workspace-status endpoint to detect configured workspace
- Auto-skip onboarding in create_user() when workspace is ready
- Fix false positive: check providers.json file exists (not _read_config fallback)
- Auto-skip in OnboardingRouter for pre-existing users with state=null
- Add 'Use existing workspace' button to Welcome screen
- Add translation keys for workspace-ready banner
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Sorry @jbmendonca, your pull request is larger than the review limit of 150000 diff characters

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Adding to this PR: A critical stability fix for the Terminal WebSocket proxy. Werkzeug 3.1 dropped native WSGI WebSocket support, causing \ lask-sock's \websocket=True\ routes to be ignored behind Traefik unless \wsgi.websocket\ is explicitly set. This resulted in the 200 OK / 404 Node.js fallback error. Added a WSGI Middleware (\ProxyFixWSGI) to intercept \HTTP_UPGRADE\ and inject the flag, plus a documentation file \docs/WEBSOCKET_PROXY_FIX.md\ explaining the architecture.

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