diff --git a/.github/workflows/e2e-tests.yml b/.github/workflows/e2e-tests.yml
index 2c005c0c5..1b505cbb2 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/e2e-tests.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/e2e-tests.yml
@@ -50,19 +50,22 @@ jobs:
         env:
           EVENT_NAME: ${{ github.event_name }}
           AUTHORIZED_USERS: ${{ secrets.AUTHORIZED_USERS }}
-          GITHUB_ACTOR: ${{ github.actor }}
+          # Gate on the PR AUTHOR (whose code this is), NOT github.actor (who triggered the run).
+          # On pull_request_target a trusted actor (e.g. a maintainer pushing to a fork PR) triggering
+          # a run must NOT cause an untrusted author's fork code to execute with our AWS role/secrets.
+          PR_AUTHOR: ${{ github.event.pull_request.user.login }}
         run: |
           if [[ "$EVENT_NAME" == "workflow_dispatch" ]]; then
             echo "✅ Manual workflow dispatch — authorized"
             echo "is_authorized=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
             exit 0
           fi
-          if [[ ",$AUTHORIZED_USERS," == *",${GITHUB_ACTOR},"* ]]; then
-            echo "✅ User ${GITHUB_ACTOR} is authorized"
+          if [[ ",$AUTHORIZED_USERS," == *",${PR_AUTHOR},"* ]]; then
+            echo "✅ PR author ${PR_AUTHOR} is authorized"
             echo "is_authorized=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
           else
-            echo "⏭️ User ${GITHUB_ACTOR} is not in AUTHORIZED_USERS — skipping E2E tests."
-            echo "ℹ️ External contributors: ask a maintainer to run the E2E tests manually via workflow_dispatch."
+            echo "⏭️ PR author ${PR_AUTHOR} is not in AUTHORIZED_USERS — skipping E2E tests."
+            echo "ℹ️ External contributors: a maintainer can run the E2E tests via workflow_dispatch after reviewing the code."
             echo "is_authorized=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
           fi
 
@@ -85,6 +88,11 @@ jobs:
         with:
           ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
           fetch-depth: 0
+          # Safe because the `authorize` job above gates on the PR AUTHOR being in AUTHORIZED_USERS:
+          # external authors skip at the gate, so only trusted authors' code is ever checked out here.
+          # Needed because authorized maintainers routinely open PRs from their own forks, and
+          # checkout@v7 otherwise refuses fork-PR checkout in pull_request_target.
+          allow-unsafe-pr-checkout: true
       - uses: actions/setup-node@v6
         with:
           node-version: '20.x'
diff --git a/.github/workflows/pr-security-review.yml b/.github/workflows/pr-security-review.yml
index bac101a83..4b0e8a3ea 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/pr-security-review.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/pr-security-review.yml
@@ -160,6 +160,12 @@ jobs:
         with:
           ref: ${{ steps.pr.outputs.head_sha }}
           fetch-depth: 0
+          # Safe to opt in here: the `authorize` job already gates on the PR AUTHOR having write/admin
+          # (getCollaboratorPermissionLevel), and this job only READS the code (compute diff, build
+          # prompt, run the review) — it never executes fork code (no npm ci / npm scripts). checkout@v7
+          # otherwise refuses fork-PR checkout in pull_request_target, which would break the review on
+          # an authorized author's fork PR. Reviewing the PR head is the whole point of this job.
+          allow-unsafe-pr-checkout: true
 
       - name: Compute diff
         id: diff
diff --git a/.github/workflows/pr-tarball.yml b/.github/workflows/pr-tarball.yml
index 5221b7884..b62de6638 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/pr-tarball.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/pr-tarball.yml
@@ -17,13 +17,16 @@ jobs:
         id: check
         env:
           AUTHORIZED_USERS: ${{ secrets.AUTHORIZED_USERS }}
-          GITHUB_ACTOR: ${{ github.actor }}
+          # Gate on the PR AUTHOR (whose code this npm build runs), NOT github.actor (who triggered the
+          # run). Otherwise a trusted actor pushing to a fork PR would run untrusted fork npm scripts
+          # with the contents:write GITHUB_TOKEN + App token in this job.
+          PR_AUTHOR: ${{ github.event.pull_request.user.login }}
         run: |
-          if [[ ",$AUTHORIZED_USERS," == *",${GITHUB_ACTOR},"* ]]; then
-            echo "✅ User ${GITHUB_ACTOR} is authorized"
+          if [[ ",$AUTHORIZED_USERS," == *",${PR_AUTHOR},"* ]]; then
+            echo "✅ PR author ${PR_AUTHOR} is authorized"
             echo "is_authorized=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
           else
-            echo "⏭️ User ${GITHUB_ACTOR} is not in AUTHORIZED_USERS — skipping."
+            echo "⏭️ PR author ${PR_AUTHOR} is not in AUTHORIZED_USERS — skipping."
             echo "is_authorized=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
           fi
 
@@ -35,6 +38,11 @@ jobs:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v7
         with:
           ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
+          # Safe because the `authorize` job above gates on the PR AUTHOR being in AUTHORIZED_USERS:
+          # external authors skip at the gate, so only trusted authors' code is ever checked out here.
+          # Needed because authorized maintainers routinely open PRs from their own forks, and
+          # checkout@v7 otherwise refuses fork-PR checkout in pull_request_target.
+          allow-unsafe-pr-checkout: true
       - uses: actions/setup-node@v6
         with:
           node-version: '20.x'